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A new security bulletin for Qubes OS has been published: QSB-094: x86/AMD: Divide speculative information leak.

QSB-094: x86/AMD: Divide speculative information leak

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin 094: x86/AMD: Divide speculative information leak. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.

             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 094 ]===---


            x86/AMD: Divide speculative information leak

User action required

Users must install the following specific packages in order to address
the issues discussed in this bulletin:

  For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
  - Xen packages, version 4.14.6-2

  For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
  - Xen packages, version 4.17.2-2

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.


On 2023-09-25, the Xen Project published XSA-439, "x86/AMD: Divide
speculative information leak" [3]:

| In the Zen1 microarchitecture, there is one divider in the
| pipeline which services uops from both threads.  In the case of #DE,
| the latched result from the previous DIV to execute will be forwarded
| speculatively.
| This is a covert channel that allows two threads to communicate
| without any system calls.  In also allows userspace to obtain the
| result of the most recent DIV instruction executed (even
| speculatively) in the core, which can be from a higher privilege
| context.

For more information, see:
 * https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7007.html


On systems with an AMD Zen (first generation) CPU, an attacker who
compromises a VM can attempt to exploit this vulnerability in order to
infer the contents of data from a different execution context on the
same CPU core. This includes data belonging to a different VM (which
could be dom0) that was previously scheduled on that CPU core and Xen
itself. The latter is relevant because some system operations require
Xen to load data from a VM. This data may or may not be sensitive.
However, the attacker has no control over the data that Xen loads (and,
to some extent, no knowledge of what was loaded).


See the original Xen Security Advisory.


[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-439.html

The Qubes Security Team

QSB-094: x86/AMD: Divide speculative information leak