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The Tor Project released Tails 7.17.1, an emergency update that completely removes uBlock Origin from Tails' Tor Browser to close a serious security hole. The flaw, tracked as GitHub Advisory GHSA-cmqw-9r2w-6wv2, is a one-click universal XSS that lets a malicious website hijack uBlock's element picker and plant a trusted filter to run attacker JavaScript on any site you visit next. Rather than ship a partial patch, Tor Project chose to rip out the whole extension even though a fix already existed upstream in uBlock Origin 1.75.4, promising to add it back as soon as possible.





Tails emergency update rips out uBlock Origin to close a one-click XSS

A critical flaw in the popular ad blocker lets a website inject code into any other site. Tor Project's fix: just delete the extension for now.

The Tor Project released Tails 7.17.1. It's an emergency fix, and it does something unusual. The update removes uBlock Origin, the ad and tracker blocker bundled with Tails' own Tor Browser, to close a serious hole. No patch. No version bump. The whole extension is simply gone for this release.

The hole is a one-click universal XSS, tracked as GitHub Advisory GHSA-cmqw-9r2w-6wv2. A malicious website can hijack uBlock Origin's element picker and plant a trusted filter that later runs attacker JavaScript inside any site you visit next. Your bank. Your webmail. Whatever you open afterward.

There's no evidence anyone has actually tried this in the wild. Tor Project's researchers say they aren't aware of the attack being used in practice. And restarting Tails wipes a planted filter clean.

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The researcher behind the disclosure offers an angle worth flagging. Smitty van Bodegom, who writes under the handle "loops" at iter.ca and goes by syvb in the security community, filed the flaw by email on November 1, 2026. He made it public with a full write-up on November 15, and in it he credits GPT-5.6 Sol with doing most of the hard work of actually finding the issue. He suspected a filter-injection UXSS was plausible, asked the model where to look, then verified what it proposed by hand. Claude wrote most of the proof-of-concept code, by his account. A model suggests where to look. A person confirms the bug is real. That pattern keeps showing up in vulnerability research, and this is a fresh instance of it landing in a production extension.

How the picker gets turned against you

uBlock Origin ships with an element picker. You reach it by right-clicking something on a page and choosing to hide it, which generates a filter rule. Normally you drive this tool. The bug lets a webpage drive it instead, in a chain of four moves.

First, the site leaks the extension's own identity. uBlock Origin carries a random per-install UUID in its internal Firefox URLs. A default filter rule in uAssets forces the extension to hit one of its own URLs, and an attacker's page hooks that request to read the UUID out.

Next the page embeds the element picker in a hidden iframe, setting opacity to zero so you never see it. Then it smuggles in a trusted filter over postMessage. A field normally used just for the resource type gets concatenated into the final filter without validation. Add a newline, and one filter splits into two. The second line is a trusted scriptlet running for an arbitrary domain. Filters made through the picker count as trusted until the next recompile, so this code runs with the same privileges as an official rule.

The only thing left is getting you to click. The attacker overlays page content over the invisible picker, or makes it fully transparent so any click lands on it. Van Bodegom noted he didn't actually build this last step in his proof-of-concept, though any of the usual click-capture tricks would do it just fine.

Once that trusted filter is in, it sticks until a recompile. An attacker can open the target site right away, so editing your filters afterward barely helps.

That brings us to the part that actually makes 7.17.1 worth looking at. The upstream fix already existed. Raymond Hill, the uBlock Origin maintainer, shipped it on November 3 in version 1.75.4. It simply launches the element picker only with a verified secret token. Yet Tails went ahead and yanked the whole extension anyway.

Speed and certainty do most of the explaining. An emergency release aimed at privacy-sensitive users cares about closing the attack surface completely, not preserving a convenience feature. A half-tested patch risks shipping something broken. Removing the extension guarantees the vector is gone.

Then there's who actually runs Tails. Journalists, activists, whistleblowers. For that crowd, losing an ad blocker for a few weeks is a bargain versus leaving a one-click XSS open.

It's arguably a reasonable call. Though it's a blunt instrument, and it does leave everyday users without their blocker against the usual ads and trackers. Tails promises to bring uBlock Origin back "as soon as possible," which is what makes this a stopgap rather than a policy shift. One thing works in the removal's favor, by the way: the malicious filter only lives in the running session, and a full restart clears Persistent Storage plus all runtime state. Even if you fell for the exploit, the blast radius stays small. Just reboot.

There's another wrinkle. Tails points out that only the Standard and Safer security levels are affected. Safest is spared, and it's not arbitrary. Tor Browser's three levels control JavaScript differently. Standard, the default, runs JS on every site, so the injected script fires as intended and the flaw is fully live. Safer disables JavaScript on HTTP sites only, leaving HTTPS open, which is where most sensitive pages live. Safest shuts JavaScript off everywhere by default, so without anything to execute, the trusted filter does nothing.

In practice that means the flaw is largely theoretical if you already browse at Safest. The real exposure is the crowd at the default Standard setting, which is a lot of people.

The wider picture

uBlock Origin was born from Raymond Hill's 2015 work, itself a fork of his earlier uBlock and HTTP Switchboard. It's now the most popular extension on Firefox, with over 11.3 million active users as of October 2026. And it has nowhere else to go in Chrome. Google pulled it from the Chrome Web Store on August 31, 2026, a casualty of the Manifest V2 shutdown, nudging users further toward Firefox and toward forks like uBO Lite. A Firefox-MV2-specific flaw in uBlock Origin is therefore especially nasty for the privacy ecosystem right now.

The confirmed chain targets the Firefox MV2 build only. On the MV2 Chromium build an attacker could also grab a longer "WAR secret," and a "similar but less problematic issue" touched the MV3-based uBO Lite, per the advisory. Only the Firefox chain was actually demonstrated. Van Bodegom did note that even after 1.75.4, the random extension ID could still leak through an alternative XHR route, and he floated a possible timing-attack bypass he couldn't reliably reproduce.

Tails itself is a Debian-based Linux distribution that boots from USB or ISO, runs entirely from RAM, and writes nothing to disk. Everything goes through Tor. It first shipped in June 2009 under the name "amnesia" and merged with the Tor Project in September 2024.

This emergency patch fits a faster, tighter release rhythm. Tails follows Firefox's two-week cycle through Tor Browser, and that cadence means out-of-band fixes are becoming normal. 7.17.1 follows Tails 7.17 on November 11. Before that came 7.15.1 in late October, an emergency removal of a compromised certificate authority, and 7.10.1, an emergency fix for kernel privilege-escalation and XML-library flaws.

Tails users should upgrade to 7.17.1. Automatic upgrades work from 7.0 onward and keep Persistent Storage. If that fails or Tails won't start afterward, use the manual route. Installing fresh erases Persistent Storage, so back it up first.

Accept the temporary loss of uBlock Origin for now. Tor Browser's own protections still apply. Bump the security level to Safer or Safest if you're doing high-risk browsing until the extension returns. And if you think you clicked through the exploit, restart Tails to clear the planted configuration.

Users of uBlock Origin outside Tails should update to 1.75.4 or later on Firefox, or the matching patched builds on other platforms. Skip untrusted sites and don't use the element picker on pages you don't trust until you do.

Head here to the release announcement.